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Abstract This paper is based on my lecture in a macro-
evolution course I team-teach with Profs. Daniel Brooks
and David Evans at the University of Toronto. The lecture
has undergone many revisions over the years as I grappled
with problems discussing certain areas (e.g., rape as an
adaptive strategy, gender “roles”). Eventually, I realized
that the problem areas said more about my personal
conflicts than they did about the science. This was one of
those epiphany moments, a time when I recognized that I
was less likely to accept hypotheses that contradicted the
way I wanted the world to be and more likely to uncritically
accept hypotheses that confirmed my world view. That
epiphany, in turn, led me to realize that science is never
separate from the personal biases/demons of its practi-
tioners, especially when we are asking questions about the
evolution of human behavior. That realization was not
novel within the vast literature of sociology and philosophy.
But it was novel for me. I was aware of discussions about
personal biases clouding scientific interpretation; I just
didn’t think it applied to me (I absorbed the philosophical
discussions without making the connection to “my world”).
So, on the heels of that epiphany, the following is a very
personal take on the question of teaching sociobiology,
based on where my journey, aided by my experience as an
ethologist and phylogeneticist and colored by my own
history, has taken me.
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As human beings, we are infinitely intrigued with our-
selves, with trying to explain who we are and where we
came from. In phylogenetic terminology, we seem to
display a plethora of behavioral autapomorphies1 that set
us far apart from other animals (Fig. 1). Are we really so
different? Why do we often do such seemingly awful
things? For most of our history, answering these questions
was the sole domain of religion and philosophy. Evolution-
ary biologists were newcomers to the debate but managed
to intensify the discussion by introducing genes into the
explanation. With that introduction came the by now
famous, often acrimonious, divide between nature and
nurture—how much of our behavior is genetically based
(that is genetically “determined”) and how much a
consequence of our environment (and thus capable of being
modified)? This question lies at the heart of sociobiological
research.
Sociobiology: The First Formulation
Darwin brought evolution into the quest to understand
ourselves and set the foundations for sociobiology when he
wrote in The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to
Sex (my italics):
During many years I collected notes on the origin or
descent of man, without any intention of publishing
on the subject, but rather with the determination not to
publish, as I thought that I should thus only add to the
1 The term autapomorphy simply means a character that is unique to a
particular species or taxon (for an extended discussion of phylogenetic
terminology, see “How to read a phylogenetic tree” in this issue of
Evolution: Education and Outreach).
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prejudices against my views. It seemed to me
sufficient to indicate, in the first edition of my ‘Origin
of Species,’ that by this work, “light would be thrown on
the origin of man and his history”; and this implies that
man must be included with other organic beings in any
general conclusion respecting his manner of appear-
ance on this earth...The sole object of this work is to
consider, firstly, whether man, like every other species,
is descended from some pre-existing form; secondly,
the manner of his development; and thirdly, the value
of the differences between the so-called races of man
(Darwin 1871: 1–3).... I fully subscribe to the
judgment of those writers who maintain that of all
the differences between man and the lower animals,
the moral sense or conscience is by far the most
important... This great question has been discussed by
many writers of consummate ability; and my sole
excuse for touching on it is... because, as far as I know,
no one has approached it exclusively from the side of
natural history. The investigation possesses, also, some
independent interest, as an attempt to see how far the
study of the lower animals can throw light on one of
the highest psychical faculties of man (Darwin 1871:
70–71).
With these words, Darwin introduced the idea that Homo
sapiens was part of the evolutionary tree of life, subject to
the same physical and biological influences as all other
living creatures. The idea, that we could, indeed must,
study ourselves within an evolutionary framework was
revolutionary. This is sociobiology. Interestingly though,
with these words, Darwin not only demonstrated the power
of sociobiology, he also showed what for many became its
fatal flaw, assigning “value” to evolutionary differences.
Scientifically, Darwin’s use of the term value was surprising
because he, unlike Lamarck, did not believe that evolution
was progressive, nor did he think that evolutionary diversi-
fication was driven solely by natural selection. Given that
Darwin was, however, an established successful Victorian
man living during the height of the British Empire, it is less
surprising that he would use the term “value,” especially
with respect to different “races” of human beings. This
duality in his thinking leads us to an important point about
doing science in general, one that is especially relevant when
we are talking about studying ourselves:
Scientists do not formulate hypotheses and interpret
data in a vacuum. We are all subject to the biases of our
upbringing, the culture and times we live in, and the belief
systems to which we subscribe. In other words, there is no
such thing as absolute objectivity. As scientists, the best we
can do is try to acknowledge our own biases and “hidden
agendas” and try, to the best of our ability, to eliminate
those influences from the way we ask questions and look
for answers. We are never completely successful.
Darwin was close to his cousin, Francis Galton, who,
among other things, spearheaded the statistical approach to
studying the measurement and evolution of intelligence,
coined the term nature–nurture, and developed the founda-
tion for eugenics. Galton’s eugenics consisted of a utopian
society in which the most intelligent men and women
would be encouraged to procreate (for a discussion of
Galton’s life and scientific contributions, see Fancher
2009). At first glance, this might seem mild compared with
the later brutalities of Nazi eugenics, but the underlying
message was the same because it involved making a
judgment about the superiority of individuals (and by
extension groups) based on the “value” of traits as judged
by the group in power at the time. Darwin revealed the
influence of interactions with his cousin and presented,
albeit not intentionally, a prime example of why studying
the where, how, when, and why of H. sapiens behavior
within a biological framework is such a controversial
approach even today when he wrote:
A most important obstacle in civilized countries to an
increase in the number of men of superior class has
been strongly insisted on by Mr. Greg and Mr. Galton,
namely, the fact that the very poor and reckless, who
are often degraded by vice, almost invariably marry
early, while the careful and frugal, who are generally
otherwise virtuous, marry late in life, so that they may
be able to support themselves and their children in
comfort. Those who marry early produce within a
given period not only a greater number of gener-
ations, but... they produce many more children. The
children, moreover, that are born by mothers during
the prime of life are heavier and larger, and therefore
probably more vigorous, than those born at other
periods. Thus the reckless, degraded, and often
vicious members of society tend to increase at a
quicker rate than the provident and generally virtuous
members. Or as Mr. Greg puts the case: “The careless,
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Fig. 1 Some of the behavioral characters we try to explain in our
quest to understand ourselves
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squalid, unaspiring Irishman multiplies like rabbits:
the frugal, foreseeing, self-respecting, ambitious Scot,
stern in his morality, spiritual in his faith, sagacious
and disciplined in his intelligence, passes his best
years in struggle and in celibacy, marries late, and
leaves few behind him … In the eternal ‘struggle for
existence,’ it would be the inferior and less favored
race that had prevailed—and prevailed by virtue not
of its good qualities, but of its faults.” (Darwin 1871:
173–174)
This discussion was more a proclamation of British
attitudes at the time towards Scotland and Ireland than it
was robust science. Nowhere are any data presented to
support the hypothesized differences between the Scots and
Irish; no alternative explanations are entertained other than
the implication that such differences are inherent. Every
time I read this paragraph to my class, everyone laughs—
the controversy seems so far away, such a part of “the past”
that no one gets offended. Then I ask the students how they
would react if I substituted Israeli/Arab, Pakistani/Indian,
“black/white,” etc. for “Scots/Irish” and they don’t find the
paragraph so amusing. In fact, it offends just about
everyone; and it offends because personal biases were
presented as statements of scientific fact.
Sociobiology: The Second Formulation
In 1975, E.O. Wilson, a professor of biology at Harvard
University, published a book that produced one of the
longest and most bitter controversies in the history of
science. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis was an amazing
feat of scholarship and insight, spanning 27 chapters, only
one of which covered H. sapiens. That one chapter was
enough to spark intense debates, which spilled over from
meetings and journals into the press (for excellent dis-
cussions, see Segerstråle 1986, 2000, 2001). At the center
of the debate was Wilson’s summary of studies indicating
that behavior had a genetic basis and was thus subject to the
influences of natural selection. The idea itself wasn’t
controversial; researchers had been studying the genetic
basis of behavior for decades. But it was one thing to
discuss fruit flies, it was quite another to posit that human
behavior, from parental care through warfare to ethics and
religion, had a genetic component. This wasn’t the first
time the nature versus nurture controversy had been
debated with some heat (the following paragraph is based
on Wozniak 2009). When Darwin died, a struggle began
between the neo-Darwinists and the neo-Lamarckists. In a
nutshell, unlike Darwin, the neo-Darwinists believed that
there was only one evolutionary force, natural selection,
and that all traits were transmitted through the germ-plasm
(Weismann’s theory of heredity: Weismann 1883; 1889).
They argued that there could be no such thing as the
inheritance of acquired characters (traits that are changed in
the parents by the environment and then passed to the
offspring) because the gametes were isolated from the
environment. Many neo-Lamarckians argued that this
perspective smacked of genetic determinism and that it
eliminated the actions of culture, will, and consciousness on
the evolution of human beings:
If the Weismann idea triumphs, it will be in a sense a
triumph of fatalism... [while] civilizing nature will
improve the individuals of each generation, its actual
effects will not be cumulative as regards the race
itself... each new generation must start de novo,
receiving no increment of the moral and intellectual
advance made during the lifetime of its predecessors.
(Osborn 1891: 363)
The accusation of genetic determinism leveled against
Wilson’s sociobiology was thus not new. What was new
was the societal context. A world shocked by the atrocities
of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia was sensitized to the
dark side of research involving genes, behavior, and human
beings. Unfortunately, that sensitization led to a parody of
Wilson’s view, which overlooked two important points.
First, Wilson never claimed that human behavior was “all in
our genes,” only that our behavior had a genetic component
and could thus evolve. He advocated the role of conscious-
ness and self-awareness as factors that could override the
genetic component underlying, say, warfare. In other
words, genes may be, in part, an explanation for some of
the awful things we do as human beings, but they are never
an excuse, given our ability as rational creatures to
understand the consequences of our actions. Second,
Wilson made some very important points about how human
behavior had been studied in the past and how we could
improve on those studies. He began with a critique of the
way in which sociobiological research was generally
conducted (my italics):
Paradoxically, the greatest snare in sociobiological
reasoning is the ease with which it is conducted.
Whereas the physical sciences deal with precise results
that are usually difficult to explain, sociobiology has
imprecise results that can be too easily explained by
many different schemes.... In sociobiology, it is still
considered respectable to use... the advocacy method...
Author X provides a hypothesis to account for a
certain phenomenon, selecting and arranging his
evidence in the most persuasive manner possible.
Author Y then rebuts X in part or in whole, raising a
second hypothesis and arguing his case with equal
conviction. Verbal skills now become a significant
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factor. Perhaps at this stage author Z appears... siding
with one or the other or concluding that both have
pieces of the truth that can be put together to form a
third hypothesis—and so forth through many journals
and over years of time (Wilson 1975: 28).
He then followed this critique with a suggestion for
improving the system (my italics):
Few people respond emotionally to debates surrounding
ant evolution. Investigating human behavior within a
sociobiological framework, however, is a different
story.... No theory should be so loved that its authors
try to move it out of harm’s way. Quite the contrary: a
theory that cannot be mortally threatened has little
value in science. Most of the art of science consists of
formulating falsifiable propositions in just this spirit.
The good researcher does not grieve over the death of
a particular hypothesis. Since he has attempted to set
up multiple working hypotheses, he is committed to
the survival of no one of them, but rather is interested
to see how simply they can be formulated and how
decisively they can be made to compete. (Wilson 1975:
28)
In essence, Wilson advocated that people reading the
results of any sociobiological study evaluate the rigor of
that study by asking (and answering) six questions:
1. What is the hypothesis?
2. What are the assumptions?
3. What data are being offered?
4. How reliable are the data?
5. Can an alternate hypothesis explain the data?
6. What else is going on (value judgment)? This last
question returns us to Darwin’s bugaboo of “value.” In
order to answer this, we have to think about the
background of the researcher, what biases he or she
might introduce to the study.
Bearing these questions in mind, let’s turn our attention
to the ways in which we have tried to study ourselves in the
years following the publication of Sociobiology.
Studying Ourselves: The Comparative Approach
The scientific method is a two-step procedure: construct a
hypothesis about the way in which something works then
set up an experiment to test that hypothesis. In order for the
experiment to produce rigorous results, all of the test
conditions must be controlled as closely as possible
(questions 3 and 4 above). For example, suppose you
hypothesize that hummingbirds are attracted to the color
red. To test this, you allow hummingbirds access to red,
yellow, and blue feeders full of sugar water and record
which feeder they visit most often. Before you release the
birds, though, you have to make sure that the feeders are
the same size and the same distance from the bird, the sugar
water is the same concentration in each feeder, the lighting
conditions are identical around each feeder, the humming-
birds are all equally hungry, etc. In other words, the only
thing that should differ in the experiment is the color of the
feeders. Now, try to imagine setting up an experiment to
test the hypothesis that human beings are more attracted to
red than to any other color. Is the context of the color
important (for example, should you use a red food, a red
square, a red shirt, red hair)? Should everyone tested be the
same age? How do you control socioeconomic factors such
as culture, level of education, prior experiences with color,
married versus single, with or without children, etc.?
Should all women in the study be at the same stage of
their estrus cycle? Although we are asking the same
question as we were with hummingbirds, the experiment
is more difficult to control because there are so many more
variables to consider when studying human beings. Now,
try to imagine setting up an experiment to study infanticide
in human beings. Impossible, right? So how have we
traditionally studied something that we cannot manipulate?
The most widespread approach involves some type of
comparison.
Comparisons Across Wide Taxonomic Scales Based
on Homologous Traits
This approach is based upon the assumption that there are
general mechanisms underlying some classes of behavior
that are common to all species (as an analogy, think of
medical science’s use of rodents and primates to study
diseases such as cancer and Alzheimer’s). For example,
psychologists assume that the mechanisms underlying
learning are shared (homologous) across all species capable
of learned behavior. A homologous trait is a trait that “looks
the same” in two or more species because it originated in
the common ancestor of those species and was passed from
that ancestor to its descendants. For example, mammary
glands originated in the ancestor of mammals, which is why
all female mammals from platypuses and echidnas to
kangaroos and Tasmanian devils to cats and mice and
gorillas and sheep suckle their young. So if the learning
mechanisms are homologous, studying the ways in which
rats and goldfish learn should reveal information that is
directly applicable to ourselves. Consider a rat. If he gets a
pellet of food (reward) every time he presses a lever, he will
eventually decrease his rate of lever pressing—he has
learned that the food is there whenever he needs it. But, if
he gets rewarded only every so often, he will increase the
number of presses—after all, the next time might be IT, the
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food might arrive. The concept of intermittent reinforce-
ment (B. F. Skinner) has been used to explain a variety of
human behaviors, the most obvious of which is gambling
addiction. After all, the next bet might bring you the
jackpot, just as the next lever press might bring the rat his
food.
This program is bigger than the careers of just a few
researchers because it requires a huge database with which
to constantly evaluate the assumption that there are indeed
homologous processes underlying the evolution of any
particular class of behavior. The assumption of homology
is, however, not easily tested, in part because the
mechanisms underlying such things as memory, perception,
associative learning, and concept learning are still largely
unknown. Collaborations between comparative psycholo-
gists, developmental biologists, and neurobiologists are
beginning to address this issue, but it will take time and
ongoing technological advances to collect and analyze the
data, coupled with the development of a theoretical
framework that will allow us to interpret those data. Until
then, the utility of this approach is dependent upon the use
of rigorous definitions (e.g., what exactly is memory?) and
experiments designed to ask questions that are biologically
relevant to the species under investigation. For example,
say an animal does not perform well in a trial using a
sequence of visual cues to test its memory. Does this mean
it is incapable of remembering or that visual cues are not an
important part of its umwelt2 (perhaps a sequence of
olfactory cues would have been more appropriate)? Now,
say the animal performs well in the trial. Does this mean
that it is “remembering” in the same way that a human
being “remembers”? As statisticians so often warn us,
correlation (in this case similar outcomes in an experiment
using different species) does not mean causation (although
it could). As Sarah Shettleworth, one of the researchers
involved in developing the area of comparative cognition,
wrote:
Attempts to investigate human-like processes in other
species often begin with asking yes/no questions and
designing pass/fail tests to answer them.... More
powerful and convincing are cases in which a more
extensive pattern of data can be sought, in effect
functional similarity in the mathematical sense of
similar relationships between dependent and indepen-
dent variables, and predictions from different theories
of the mechanisms involved pitted against each other
in experiments. (Shettleworth 2009:213)
In other words, studying ourselves based on the
assumption of behavioral homology with other species
requires precise definitions to avoid miscommunication
between researchers, the construction of alternative hypoth-
eses to explain a given phenomenon, rigorous experiments
to test those hypotheses, continued advances in delineating
the mechanisms underlying the phenomenon, and a healthy
dose of skepticism (in fact, all of the things that are required
for any research program).
Comparisons Across Wide Taxonomic Scales Based
on Convergent Traits
Convergent characters are defined as similar-looking traits
in distantly related organisms that have evolved because of
factors other than common ancestry (the traits are not
homologous). So, for example, birds and mammals are both
warm-blooded (homeothermic), that is, they are able to
maintain a constant body temperature even though the
temperature in their environment varies. Cold-blooded
(poikilothermic) animals like fish, amphibians, snakes,
lizards, crocodiles, and turtles cannot maintain an internal
temperature; they are physiologically at the mercy of their
environment. In a phylogenetic study, you begin with the
hypothesis that two traits that “look the same” (e.g.,
homeothermy) are the same (are homologous). This
hypothesis is tested by collecting as many characters as
possible and searching for groupings among taxa that are
supported by the majority of those characters. So analyzing
hundreds of molecular and morphological traits for the
large group encompassing ray-finned fishes to amniotes
(mammals+reptiles) indicates that birds and mammals are
not each other’s closest relatives (Fig. 2). Given this,
homeothermy must have evolved twice. Our initial hypoth-
esis that homeothermy is homologous in birds and
mammals is thus falsified. Once convergent characters have
been identified, the quest begins to test the second
assumption made about characters of this type: they
evolved for the same reason. In other words, the factors
influencing the evolution of a particular character
(homeothermy) in taxon A (mammals) are the same as the
factors influencing the evolution of that character in taxon
B (birds).
One of the most famous examples of this approach in
sociobiology is the study of infanticide in lions. When a
male takes over a pride, he often kills all the cubs. This
seemingly horrendous action is hypothesized to persist
because it benefits the male in two ways: (1) he doesn’t
expend energy raising another male’s offspring and (2)
released from the physiological constraints of nursing, the
females quickly come into heat again, which means the
male can get on with the business of fathering his own
cubs. All of this makes sense evolutionarily given that
2 The term used by von Uexkull (1934) to call attention to the unique
sensory world inhabited by each species, many parts of which are
beyond the perceptual capabilities of mere biologists.
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fitness is based (in part) upon your relative genetic
contribution to the future. If we extrapolate from lions to
human beings, we would predict that infanticidal indi-
viduals should be (a) men who are (b) not related to the
children they kill and are (c) in a relationship with the
mother. Studies do confirm these predictions; stepfathers
kill their stepchildren at much higher rates than do
biological fathers (Daly and Wilson 1991, 1994, and
references therein). Have we explained the behavior? The
answer to this question is a resounding no. We have gained
some insight into the evolution of infanticide in H. sapiens,
some factors that might explain why such a seemingly
aberrant behavior persists in our species. But it is obvious
that we don’t have a complete explanation because, after
all, infanticide is not restricted to men, to men unrelated to
the children, or even to individuals; sometimes, it is a group
phenomenon (e.g., the abortion, killing, or neglect of female
children in India and China; Sumner 2009; Coale and
Banister 1996).
Wilson cautioned us to beware of assumptions. As
mentioned above, the most common assumption that people
make when using this type of comparative approach is that
if the behavior displayed by species A looks the same as the
behavior in distantly related species B, then it must have
arisen for the same reasons. This assumption is not easy to
validate because it is generally difficult to pinpoint all of
the factors surrounding the evolution of any character, let
alone one as complicated as infanticide. For example, male
lions only hold a pride for three years on average, so they
have a very limited window for reproductive opportunities.
The reproductive life span of a human male is much longer,
the ability to father offspring outside of any relationship
with one woman much greater. This means that some of the
basic social factors are not identical in the two species, so it
is not surprising that we only uncover one piece of the
evolutionary puzzle with regard to infanticide in humans by
studying lions.
The major flaw with the “long-distance” comparative
approach is that:
characters do not evolve in a vacuum. As the species
being compared become more and more distantly related,
the phenotype of the organisms, the contextual basis for the
origin of the convergent behaviors, becomes increasingly
different. Although humans and lions share much in
common because we are both mammals, we are not
identical, closer than say humans and fruit flies, but still
not the same (Fig. 3). It is therefore not surprising that one
species cannot serve as a complete surrogate for another in
sociobiological studies of convergent traits, particularly
when the phylogenetic distance between the two is great.
Comparisons Across Narrow Taxonomic Scales; Looking
at Our Closest Relatives
One response to the preceding caveat is to focus our
sociobiological studies on animals that are as closely related
to us as possible—that is, turn our attention to primates in
general and the Great Apes in particular. Such an approach
will help us pinpoint the origin of some human behaviors.








Fig. 2 Identifying convergent evolution on a phylogenetic tree. The
hypothesis that the character homeothermy (warm-bloodedness) is the
same (=homologous) in mammals and birds is refuted when we place
homeothermy on a phylogenetic tree constructed from hundreds of
other characters. The phylogenetic patterns indicate that poikilothermy
(cold-bloodedness) is the ancestral state for this large group and that
homeothermy has originated twice from that state. Homeothermy is
thus a convergent trait. Asterisks = homeothermy
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primates? A cursory reading of the literature indicates that
the behavior might be an old one, possibly originating in
the common ancestor of the Old World monkeys (e.g.,
baboons, macaques) + Hominoidea (= gibbons + orang-
utans + gorillas + chimpanzees + us). Do all the species that
share this behavior have other characters in common that
might provide an underlying explanation for its mainte-
nance over such a long period of time and through so many
speciation events? If so, this might explain, in part at least,
the maintenance of infanticide in H. sapiens.
I think one of the most powerful results of studying our
closest relatives is the realization that we are not as unique
as we thought. For example, when many mammals look in
a mirror, they respond to their image as if it were just
another conspecific. The first time a kitten sees its
reflection in a mirror, it raises its paw and bats at “that
cat.” This has been termed the recognition of “other.” Now,
if you sedate a mammal (say a gibbon), paint a dot on her
forehead, then (when she regains consciousness) allow her
to look in a mirror, she acts as usual, curiosity about that
other, but nothing else. If, however, you do the same thing
with a chimpanzee or an orangutan or a human being, the
first thing she does after looking in the mirror is to touch
the spot on her forehead, then she turns around to try and
see things in the mirror that she has never been able to see!
She has made the connection between the reflection and
herself. This is called the recognition of “self,” something
that is clearly older than H. sapiens (reviewed in Suddendorf
and Collier-Baker 2009: Fig. 4). Researchers are uncovering
the early stages for other “human” traits such as charity,
reciprocity, and punishment for cheating (de Waal 1996),
tool use and cultural transmission, warfare, language, and
face-to-face copulation in our primate roots. All in all,
losing our uniqueness is not so unexpected. After all, we
are but a branch on the evolutionary tree of life, not a
separate shrub!
The Great Apes have so much to show us about
ourselves. They are indeed so close to us in many ways
that many people are beginning to question just how ethical
it is to use them as test subjects. New Zealand, the
Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, Germany, and Austria
currently ban using Great Apes in research. The Great
Ape Project, an international organization of primatologists,
psychologists, ethicists, and biologists, is campaigning for
the United Nations to grant three basic rights to all Great
Apes: the right to life, protection of individual liberty, and
the prohibition of torture (see Wikipedia entry: http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Ape_Project). If you have any
doubts about the importance of such a declaration, get
Frans de Waal’s book Bonobo, The Forgotten Ape (1998)
and look at the picture of a bonobo female in a classic yoga
pose, sitting with one leg and arm stretched upwards and
sideways, clasping her pointed toes with her fingers.
Looking at the photograph is like looking at yourself, at
least that’s the way I find it. Primatologists like Jane
Goodall, Birute Galdikas, Dian Fossey, and Franz de Waal
have shown us that we can learn a substantial amount about
Great Ape behavior in the field. Of pressing concern now is
the fact that all Great Ape populations are endangered or
critically endangered in the wild and all have decreasing
populations, except, of course, for H. sapiens (IUCN 2008
Red List: www.iucnredlist.org). If the Great Apes go
extinct, we will lose more than just a unique component
of this planet’s biodiversity; we will lose the ability to learn
much about ourselves. We will become evolutionary
orphans.
fruit flyhumansFig. 3 Diagram showing all the
character changes (represented by
slash marks) that exist between
distantly related animals. This
figure is purely heuristic—it is a
grossly simplified picture of ani-
mal phylogeny and character di-
versification. Another way to
think about the figure is that it is a
diagrammatic way of saying that
there are vast genetic, physiolog-
ical, morphological, ecological,
and behavioral differences
between, say, an insect and a
human being
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Comparisons Across Narrow Taxonomic Scales; Looking
Within Ourselves
We do, of course, have some characteristics that are unique
to Homo, traits that originated somewhere during the
history of our genus and that cannot be studied by reference
to other groups, no matter how closely related. This we can
do only by reference to ourselves, which requires that we
narrow the focus of our research beam even more.
Unfortunately, with the exception of H. sapiens, all of the
members of the subfamily Hominina, which includes
genera such as Homo and Australopithecus, are extinct, so
we can never pinpoint the origins of these unique traits. We
can, however, study the maintenance of these traits by
examining the conditions under which they are expressed in
different groups of human beings.
This pursuit has traditionally been the domain of cultural
anthropology and thus has not always been viewed within an
evolutionary framework. To do this, we would need to
construct a robust phylogeny for H. sapiens. Technically, this
is not problematical: phylogeographers have been using
genetic data from the mitochondrion and nucleus to study
population interrelationships within widespread species for
over 10 years (Avise 2000). The problem lies in the
interpretation of those data, with our disposition to classify
life forms as either “primitive” or “advanced.” The idea of a
linear scala naturae or “Chain of Being” was first proposed
by Aristotle, who theorized that the chain moved from non-
living matter to plants to insects to animals with “non-perfect”
eggs (e.g., fish) to animals with perfect eggs (e.g., birds) to
mammals to man to god (http://scienceworld.wolfram.com/
biography/Aristotle.html). The details of the chain changed
across the millennia (for a painting of the chain from 1579,
see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_chain_of_being), but
one thing was invariant: we always put ourselves just one
step from the top, below god but above all other forms of life.
Darwin did not believe that evolution produced a
progressive, linear Chain of Being. He even made a note
to himself never to use the terms “higher” or “lower” when
speaking about different forms of life (Tattersall 2009). The
very process of natural selection, however, required that
one trait replace another, leading to the assessment that the
second trait was somehow “better” than the first. Take this
reasoning one step further and you have the situation in
which people argue that some species or groups are “better
than,” “more fit than,” and “superior to” other species (the
modern scala naturae). This type of attitude is reflected, as
are all attitudes, in language; so we speak of “primitive”
(e.g., sharks) and “advanced” (e.g., human beings)
species. If you think about it though, sharks have been
on this planet about 430 million years longer than H.
sapiens. They have specialized cells called the ampullae of
Lorenzini that are extremely sensitive to electric fields.
Smooth dogfish can detect current as tiny as five billionths
of a volt per centimeter—the ionic leakage across the gills
of a buried flounder. Hardly “primitive” but definitely a
different umwelt than that occupied by H. sapiens.
The point here is that, as Darwin realized, there is no
objective way to define or measure the terms “primitive” or
“advanced.” Organisms are a mosaic of thousands of traits,
so the argument about one trait being “better” than another
is impossible to apply above the level of the individual
character; and even at the level of the character, it is only a
relative judgment because the performance of a trait varies
through space, with changing environmental conditions and
challenges, and through time; evolution is not static and
absolute, it is relative. So to establish a “fitness” scale for








Fig. 4 Phylogeny for the Hom-
inoidea (gibbons + Great Apes)
showing the hypothesized point
of origin for self-awareness,
indicating that awareness of
yourself as an individual is older
than human beings. This is just
one of many traits that we share
with our closest relatives. We
are not as unique as we might
think
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trait in species A and species B, then add up all the pluses
and minuses to produce an overall ranking. More impor-
tantly, even if you could surmount the staggering logistical
problems and produce such a ranking, you would
constantly have to reevaluate and readjust that number
as conditions around the species changed. The take-home
message is simple: species are not “primitive” or
“advanced,” “inferior” or “superior”; they are simply
different, in part because each has adapted to a slightly
different environment.
Now, extrapolate from (faulty) judgments about better or
worse in terms of species to “superior” or “inferior” in
terms of populations or lineages and you can see what the
problem would be with interpreting a phylogeny for H.
sapiens. There would be a tendency to assign the term
“primitive” to groups near the base of the tree, to believe
that the groups at the “tip” of the tree are somehow
superior, when what we are really talking about is a
complicated mosaic of groups that share many traits (in
fact most) in common but have diverged as each group
meets its own unique environmental challenges. A phylog-
eny of H. sapiens would be an incredibly powerful tool that
we could use to explore the vast database amassed by
cultural anthropologists, to begin answering questions
about the evolution of traits unique to human beings.
Anyone who undertakes such a project, however, must
emphasize repeatedly that there is no such thing as
evolutionary superiority, only evolutionary differences.
Summary
It is not easy to study ourselves for the obvious reason that
it is difficult to study all the factors influencing the way in
which a system works from inside the system. Part of the
reason for the difficulty is that scientists are never
impervious to the society in which they are born. We all
bring our own individual biases and blinkers into a study
and that affects the ways in which we ask questions, search
for answers and interpret the data we collect. The impact of
this problem is amplified when we study ourselves,
particularly our own behavior. Does this mean the quest
to understand ourselves is futile? No, I don’t think so.
Sociobiology, which I widely define to include all compar-
ative evolutionary approaches to studying behavior (so this
includes evolutionary studies in biology, psychology,
psychiatry, anthropology, and sociology), provides us with
tools to uncover some of the data needed to address the
problem. Molecular biology adds more data with the
demonstration that the “one gene–one trait” metaphor
grossly oversimplifies what is actually happening during
development. For example, substances laid down in the
cytoplasm of the egg can have a profound impact on early
developmental processes independent of the genotype of
the developing embryo. This makes total genetic control of
complex human behaviors, of any complex behavior for
that matter, extremely unlikely. In other words, a genetic
component to behavior does not necessarily mean that
expression of the behavior is genetically determined. It is
tempting to say that our behavioral fates are influenced by,
but not written in, our genes, but I think that a more realistic
statement is that we currently know next to nothing about the
mechanisms underlying human behavior.What we do know is
that “nature versus nurture” always was an artificial dichot-
omy and, because it is such a simplistic vision, can be
dangerously misleading when discussing something as
emotionally charged as why we do what we do. The
development and expression of any complex behavior will
most likely always be an intricate interaction between genes
and the environment, all the components of which will not be
easy to discover (for a comprehensive discussion of the
nature–nurture problem, see Bateson 2001).
One of the wonderful and disturbing things about
science is that we never uncover the truth. At the very
best, we find an explanation that best fits the data we have
at a particular point in space and time. There is no
guarantee that what we discover about ourselves during
this evolutionary journey will always be comfortable or
“acceptable.” All we can do, what we must do, is strive to
judge all studies of human behavior according to the six
questions delineated previously, to be as rigorous as
possible, and to try never to let personal judgments of
“value” color the way we interpret data.
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